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SECURITIES REGULATION
George Lee Flint, Jr.*
ECURITIES regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing
and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
Although this article includes Fifth Circuit cases under federal law,
the author has attempted to limit the material to that involving state law,'
and only briefly touches federal securities law.2 The author does not in-
tend this article to be an exhaustive survey of securities regulation, but
rather an update regarding developments of interest to the Texas based
securities practitioner.
I. COVERAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions, especially those relating to the issues of what consti-
tutes a security, who may recover, and the territorial reach, determine the
scope of the securities acts.
A. THE SECURITY DEFINITION
In the criminal case of Bailey v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals
faced the issue of whether a bank certificate of deposit constituted a se-
curity. The trial court had convicted the defendant of selling unregistered
securities fraudulently without being a registered salesman in violation of
the Texas Securities Act ("TSA"). The alleged securities were uninsured
certificates of deposit issued by a Granadian bank, sold through adver-
tisements touting the certificates as federally-insured. The definition of a
security contained in the TSA does not include the phrase "certificate of
deposit. ' 3 At trial, the Director of the Enforcement Division of the Texas
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.,
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D., 1975, University
of Texas at Austin.
1. Texas has two major statutes to combat securities fraud: the Texas Securities Act
[hereinafter TSA] and the Texas Stock Fraud Act [hereinafter TSFA]. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1-10 (Vernon Supp. 2004) ("TSA"); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.01 (Vernon 2002) ("TSFA").
2. Since the Texas Legislature based portions of the TSA on the federal securities
statutes and Texas courts rely on federal decisions to interpret the corresponding sections
of the TSA, this article also examines federal developments in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g.,
COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES & INVESTMENT BANKING OF THE SECTION ON BANKING AND
BUSINESS LAW OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, COMMENT-1977 Amendment, following
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 2004); Herman Holdings Ltd. v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2002) (for TSA fraud provision, TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
3. See TEX. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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State Securities Board ("Board") testified as an expert witness out of the
presence of the jury that, in his opinion, the certificates were securities
because they were "investment contracts" and "evidences of indebted-
ness," both of which are included within the definition of a security. Con-
sequently, the trial court charged the jury that the certificates of deposit
were securities. Focusing on the prosecution's U.S. Supreme Court cases
laying out the tests for "investment contracts" and "uncollateralized and
uninsured promissory notes," the appellate court held that whether certif-
icates of deposit were securities was a fact question for the jury, not a
question of law for the court, and so reversed and remanded for a new
trial.4
Federal cases accepted by Texas courts, however, specify in the civil
context that whether an instrument is a security is a matter of law. 5 But
for criminal matters, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a crim-
inal defendant has a right to a jury determination of all elements of the
crime.6 One element of the securities fraud conviction is that "securities"
be sold or offered.
In the civil rescission case of Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., the appellate
court replayed the fact pattern of SEC v. Life Partners Incorporated7 for
the TSA rather than the federal securities acts. 8 The investment involved
4. Bailey v. State, 155 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, pet. struck). The
U.S. Supreme Court cases were SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (defining an in-
vestment contract), and Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (laying out poten-
tial tests for whether a note is a security).
Under federal law, some cases find certificates of deposit to be securities, others find
certificates of deposit not securities. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Certificate of deposit as "Se-
curity" Under Federal Securities Laws, 82 A.L.R. FED. 553, 566-86 (1987). The Securities
Act mentions "certificates of deposit;" however, it probably refers to certificates issued for
depositing other securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1997) ("certificate of deposit for a se-
curity"). So a certificate of deposit in Texas would not be what is "commonly known as a
security, whether similar to those herein referred or not." See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 581-4A (Vernon Supp. 2004).
5. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (evidence of indebtedness);
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (investment contract);
Campbell v. C.D. Payne & Gelderman Sec., Inc., 894 S.W.2d 411, 417-18 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
6. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) ("We have held [the due
process requirement of the Fifth Amendment] to require criminal conviction to rest upon a
jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he
is charged beyond a reasonable doubt.")
7. See generally SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Judge
Ginsburg). The principal behind Life Partners, Incorporated is Brian D. Pardo. The au-
thor's law firm represented Pardo's prior public company, American Solar King Corpora-
tion, with respect to securities matters. After the author left Waco, the Securities and
Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] sanctioned Pardo for filing fraudulent financial
statements for American Solar King Corporation. See Accounting & Auditing Enforce-
ment Act, SEC Litigation Rel. No. 12762, 48 SEC Docket 64 (Jan. 18, 1991) (consent to
permanent injunction); Complaint Names Ask Corp. & Brian D. Pardo 1989 SEC News
LEXIS 115, July 29, 1989, available at SEC News Digest Issue No. 89-137 (complaint for
materially overstating revenues in 1983, 1984, and 1985); see also Fine v. Am. Solar King
Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1990) (detailing the method of overstatement), cert.
denied sub nom. Main Hurdman v. Fine, 502 U.S. 976 (1991).
8. The definition of "security" is not exactly the same under the two acts, but for the
instruments in question, they resemble each other. Compare TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
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a purchase of a viatical settlement by an IRA. In a viatical settlement,
the investor acquires a fractional interest in a life insurance policy held by
a terminally ill person for a steep discount that depends on the insured's
remaining life expectancy. The success of the investment depends on pre-
sale estimates of the insured's life expectancy and the post-sale length of
the insured's life. Federal law does not permit IRAs to invest in insur-
ance contracts, 9 so the transaction is structured through a trust, which
buys the interest in the insurance contract and sells a non-recourse prom-
issory note, secured by the insurance policy proceeds, to the investor.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court, in an opinion by Justice Ruth
Ginsburg, determined that the viatical interest was not an investment
contract under the federal securities laws because, although it satisfied
the expectation of profits and common enterprise elements, it lacked
profits derived from the non-ministerial efforts of others post-sale. The
dissent urged that the non-ministerial pre-sale efforts, where the potential
for fraud exists, should satisfy the requirement. The Circuit Court also
determined that the promissory note feature would not turn the non-se-
curities investment into a security. In the replay under the Texas statute,
the Texas trial court granted a motion for summary judgment denying the
rescission of the purchase. The appeals court affirmed and noted that the
Texas Supreme Court has accepted the federal definition of an invest-
ment contract, contained in the TSA,10 and that Texas courts additionally
have found the profits-from-the-efforts-of-others element unsatisfied
when the investor merely holds an investment in anticipation of matur-
ity. 1 The Board does not agree.' 2 Similarly, the court refused to convert
the transaction into a security because of the use of the trust and note
structure for IRA investments. 13
art. 581-4A (Vernon Supp. 2004) ("mortgage certificate or other evidence of indebtedness
... investment contract ... or any other instrument commonly known as a security .... ")
with 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2002) ("evidence of indebtedness ... investment contract...
any instrument commonly known as a security .... "); see also Searsy v. Commercial Trad-
ing Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. 1977) ("'investment contract' and 'evidence of indebt-
edness' of the TSA appear to have been taken from ... the Securities Act of 1933").
9. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(3) (2002).
10. See Searsy, 560 S.W.2d at 640.
11. See Wilson v. Lee, 601 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)
(interests in raw land); McConathy v. Dal Mac Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 545 S.W.2d
871, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ) (same).
12. See In re Agent Registration of Larry James Kiefer, No. IC04-SUS-02, 2004 WL
284157, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 30, 2004) (finding viatical settlements securities in
order to reprimand and suspend agent for selling unregistered interests in viatical
settlements).
13. Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 10-01-00271-CV, 2004 WL 1178418, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Waco May 26, 2004, pet. granted). The court summarily disregarded plaintiff's ar-
guments for securities status by reason of "other evidences of indebtedness," also included
in the definition of securities under the TSA, as insufficiently fleshed out. Since the court
found no security, it did not reach the insurance contract exception to the definition of a
security under the TSA. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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B. STANDING TO SUE
In Caso-Bercht v. Striker Industries, Inc., the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals confronted the argument that shareholders holding in "street
name" as beneficial owners have no standing to sue for the fraud reme-
dies under both the state and federal securities laws. The securities laws
provide remedies for purchasers and sellers,14 since these investors gener-
ally have privity with the fraudulent promoter. The trial court granted
summary judgment dismissing the investors' causes of action based on
affidavits claiming the issuer's records showed no purchases by the inves-
tors, but without attaching those records. It is well known, and the appel-
late court took judicial notice, that many shareholders purchase securities
in street name, thrice removed from the name appearing on the issuer's
shareholder list. The shareholder leaves the securities with their broker,
who leaves them with a depository firm, who uses a nominee name for
the issuer's shareholder list. Securities and Exchange Commission regu-
lations provide that brokers and depositories must compile a list of non-
objecting beneficial owners with name, address, and positions at an is-
suer's request within five business days.' 5 This means that the issuer
could have discovered the identities of most of the beneficial owners had
they tried. Based on decisions under federal law permitting beneficial
owners to sue,16 the court concluded that beneficial owners had sufficient
interests to sue for fraud with respect to the purchases made through
their brokers' depository by their brokers exercising authority under dis-
cretionary accounts. The investors showed that the issuer's shareholder
list contained the name of their depository. Since the issuer's supporting
affidavits for the summary judgment did not mention the depository's
name or the possibility that the investors were beneficial owners, the affi-
davits were defective as not attaching the issuer's records. The court re-
versed the trial court's summary judgment. 17
In Kelly v. Rio Grande Computerland Group, the El Paso Court of Ap-
peals dealt with another standing problem, this time with respect to the
Texas Stock Fraud Act ("TSFA"), for a corporate officer expelled by the
new controlling owners of the corporation. The officer had entered into a
stock issuance agreement with the new owners for sixty percent of the
corporation. The prior letter of intent for the transaction provided for a
14. See TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A (Vernon Supp. 2004) ("to the person buy-
ing the security from him"); TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 81-33B (Vernon Supp. 2004) ("to
the person selling the security to him"); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) ("any person acquiring"); 15
U.S.C. 771(2) (2002) ("person purchasing such security from him").
15. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-l(b)(3)(i) (2004).
16. See 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, 38 F.3d 211, 226-29 (5th Cir.
1994) (beneficial owners of limited partnership units exchanged for stock had standing to
sue under section 10-b and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Act for misrepresentations and
omissions); In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1985) (can
expressly assign a cause of action under the trust indenture act for misrepresentation or
omission).




shareholder agreement to elect the officer as a director and an employ-
ment agreement for the officer. These documents were never prepared,
and the new owners never elected the officer as a director and fired him
as officer within five months of the closing. Among the many causes of
action was the claim under the TSFA, which allows recovery for fraudu-
lently inducing a person to enter into a contract involving the sale of
stock. 18 The officer contended that the representations made in the letter
of intent were future promises of material facts made with no intention of
fulfilling them. The trial court had granted summary judgment to the new
owners based on the idea that only a purchaser or seller of stock can
enforce the TSFA. The appellate court noted that the specific language
of the TSFA is not limited to purchasers or sellers, but permits a remedy
to a person induced into the contract involving the sale of the stock. 19
The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded.2 0
C. TERRITORIAL EXTENT
The two courts considering the application of the Texas securities acts
in multi-state situations used the most significant relations test adopted
by the Texas Supreme Court.21 Both cases dealt with those who assisted
in the fraud.22 It is not clear that this is the correct approach to handle
the choice of law issue for the TSA. The most significant relations test
applies only if the state statute does not contain a directive.23 Last year, a
Texas court adjudicating an action against an unregistered seller selling
from Texas to non-residents ruled that the TSA contained a directive to
use Texas law.2 4 The test of the Texas Supreme Court, however, might
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2) (Vernon 2002) ("Fraud in a transac-
tion involving... stock in a corporation... consists of a false promise to do an act, when
the false promise is (a) material; (b) made with the intention of not fulfilling it; (c) made to
a person for the purpose of inducing the person to enter into a contract .... .
19. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b) (Vernon 2002) ("A person who makes
a false promise.., is liable to the person defrauded .... "). For additional support, the
court in Caso-Bercht cited cases under the TSA, a statute that mentions only the liability of
sellers and purchasers. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-29(c), 581-33 (Vernon
Supp. 2004) (penal and civil provisions, providing remedies for co-venturers against the
venturing promoter); Lewis v. Davis, 199 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. 1947) (prior version of the
TSA); Manley v. State, 774 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ ref'd).
20. Kelly v. Rio Grande Computerland Group, 128 S.W.3d 759, 771 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2004, no pet. h.).
21. See Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. 2000) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971), the law in Texas since
1979).
22. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971) ("A court, sub-
ject to its constitutional restrictions will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law .... ").
24. See Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hakim Daccach, 105 S.W.3d 712, 723 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003, pet. granted) (the issue arose in an attempt to defeat a class certification).
The rationale was that the definition of sale included "every disposition," including those
made from Texas. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4E (Vernon Supp. 2004). So
the remedy for the sale of securities by an unregistered dealer under the TSA applied to
sales made from Texas affecting non-residents. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
33A(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004). The State Securities Board has long contended the TSA
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not conclude similarly.25 The issue will be whether the statutory directive
must provide the choice of law rule or merely an unlimited definition
implying Texas law.
The importance of whether the TSA applies to the transaction involves
the ability to recover. The New York Blue Sky Law does not provide for
an express or implied remedy for securities fraud. 26 The Uniform Securi-
ties Act, adopted by many states, does not provide for aider liability.27
In Greenberg Traurig of New York, P.C. v. Moody, the Houston Four-
teenth District Court of Appeals dealt with an out-of-state bankrupt cor-
poration that had sold its securities to Texas accredited investors under
the representation that an initial public offering was imminent. The in-
vestors sued the New York law firm, which parties handled in handling
the corporation's securities matters, for assisting the corporation's fraud
by failing to disclose certain items that would have tipped investors to the
fact that the corporation's principal was a defrauder. The investors had
no contact or direct dealings with the law firm. The acts of the law firm
participating in the fraud consisted of an opinion letter used to obtain a
bank loan, a communication to some shareholders with respect to a re-
scission offer, attendance at the annual shareholder meeting, and intro-
ducing the corporation to investment bankers. All of these acts enabled
the corporation to maintain the illusion of an imminent public offering;
all the acts occurred in New York. The jury found the law firm liable for
violations of the TSA and the TSFA, among other causes of action, and
the trial court awarded substantial damages. Focusing on the factors
mandated by the most significant relationship test for torts and damages
arising from fraud,28 predominately where the conduct occurred, the ap-
applied to sales made from Texas to non-residents. See Enntex Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 560S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Regulation B offering)(citing Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State, 539 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lstDist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.7 (West 2005). Texas courts have
also held that similar statutory definitions constitute the directive for the choice of Texaslaw, even for the reverse situation of out-of-state facts affecting Texas residents. See Busse
v. Pac. Cattle & Feeding Fund No. 1, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1995, writ denied) (definition of "trade" as including a sale "wherever situated" meantTexas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(6) (Vernon
2002), applied to out-of-state acts affecting Texas residents).
But see Lutheran Bhd. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 829 S.W.2d 300, 309-10 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1992, pet. granted, jdgm't vacated w.r.m., 820 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1992)) (using the
most significant relations test for misrepresenting out-of-state seller under TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004), concluding Texans use TSA, non-Tex-
ans do not).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. to 6(1) (1971) (stat-ing that such statutes are rare, and providing examples from the Uniform Commercial
Code mentioning parties choice of law specifically); see also Mitchell v. State Farm Ins. Co.,68 P.3d 703, 708 (Mont. 2003) (using § 6(1) to use MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102 (2003) (tointerpret a contract, use law where performed)); State ex rel. Smith v. Early, 934 S.W.2d
655, 657 (Tenn. App. 1996) (using § 6(1) to use TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-207(a) (2001) (for
support, use laws of "state where obligor was present during period for which support is
sought")).
26. See CPC Intern'l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118-19 (N.Y. 1987).
27. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33 cmt. 33F (Vernon Supp. 2004).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 148 (1971).
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pellate court noted that substantially all the conduct occurred in New
York, rather than Texas. The appellate court then examined the general
principles of the most significant relationship test. It noted that (1) New
York has a substantial interest in regulating fraudulent conduct in New
York, (2) New York lawyers rendering legal services in New York would
have no reasonable expectations that Texas law would apply, and (3)
Texas has no interest in regulating the communications between New
York lawyers and their non-Texas clients. Consequently, the court re-
versed judgments with respect to the TSA and the TSFA, and in light of
the New York rule against express and implied private causes of action,
rendered judgment.29
The rationale behind the passage of the Blue Sky laws was to allow the
state to protect its citizens from fraud perpetrated out of state.30 Cer-
tainly, Texas has an interest in preventing out of state acts that aid com-
mission of fraud on Texas residents, rather than to insulate acts that aid
fraud solely because they occurred out of state. These aiders know and
expect that, if the securities are sold to Texans, the TSA applies to those
transactions. It is not clear that the court decided this matter correctly,
ignoring these two elements of the choice of law test.
In Grant Thornton LLP v. Suntrust Bank, the Dallas Court of Appeals
considered the reverse situation. A corporation headquartered in Texas
sold securities to non-residents by means of misstatements contained in
the registration statement. Since the stock plunged in value, two non-
resident investors sought class certification for violation of the federal
and Texas securities acts against the corporation's independent auditors.
The acts aiding the corporation's fraud consisted of amending the regis-
tration statement's financials to claim "accounting error" rather than
management misrepresentations that mislabeled certain transactions as
sales rather than consignments resulting in an overstatement of earnings.
The aid also included failure to disclose the auditors' payment from the
proceeds of the offering. The trial court certified the class. The auditors
opposed the certification on interlocutory appeal on the ground that the
choice of law issue mandated that all fifty state's securities laws destroyed
the uniformity of issues for the class. Applying the factors mandated by
the most significant relationship test for torts and damages arising from
fraud,31 the court could not decide which law applied because receipt by
29. Greenberg Traurig of New York, P.C. v. Moody, No. 14-02-00581-CV, 2004 WL
2188088, at *38 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2004, no pet. h.).
30. See Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 588 (1917) (purpose is to prevent
fraud against Michigan residents); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yard Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564
(1917) (in title to prevent fraud in sale of securities to South Dakota residents); Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1917) (prevention of deception against Ohio re-
sidents); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 347, 353-60 (1991) (purpose is to prevent sale to local residents of overvalued,
speculative and fraudulent securities); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory
Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 19-20 (1983) (in response to corporate fraud
schemes of 1910-1987 on local residents).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 148 (1971).
11412005]
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many investors of the prospectus and purchases occurred outside of Texas
and was balanced by the auditors' work and misrepresentations occurring
in Texas. Turning to the general principles of the most significant rela-
tionship test, the court noted that: Texas had the most incentive to regu-
late corporations operating in Texas; the Texas act is not limited to
protecting residents, other states with aid prohibitions or short statutes of
limitations have little interest in regulating auditors of corporations in
Texas; investors in corporations in Texas would expect Texas law to apply,
other states support the Texas policy of protecting investors; and allowing
Texas law to apply to corporations in Texas provides certainty and ease of
application. The court concluded the trial court did not err in applying
the TSA to all investors, including non-residents. 32
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE SECURITIES BOARD
The TSA created the State Securities Board ("Board"), a regulatory
body to handle the registrations required by those laws, as well as to
serve as an enforcement mechanism. The Board amended its hearings
rules to give the Director of Inspections and Compliance Division author-
ization to sign a notice of hearing in an administrative case filed with the
State Office of Administrative Hearings; this removed the need to keep
assistant directors in the Enforcement Division in that capacity. 33
III. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
The basic rule of most securities laws is that securities either need to be
registered with the regulatory agency or fall within an exemption to regis-
tration. The Board made several cosmetic changes to its securities regis-
tration rules to reflect current developments. The Board amended its
rules regarding applications for registration,34 forms for registration, 35
conditional exemption for money market funds,36 and filings and fees 37 to
reflect recent changes to the TSA.
The Board had numerous enforcement actions against issuers who did
not register their securities, and some involved the internet.38 One action
32. Grant Thornton LLP v. Suntrust Bank, 133 S.W.3d 342, 361 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2004, pet. filed).
33. 29 Tex. Reg. 7966 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 105.6 without com-
ment); 29 Tex. Reg. 1756 (2004) (proposed Feb. 27, 2004).
34. 29 Tex. Reg. 1643 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 113.4 without com-
ment); 28 Tex. Reg. 9176 (2003) (proposed Oct. 24, 2003).
35. 29 Tex. Reg. 1645 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE §§ 133.7, 133.12, 133.13,
133.26 without comment); 28 Tex. Reg. 9180 (2003) (proposed Oct. 24, 2003).
36. 29 Tex. Reg. 1644 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 123.3 without com-
ment); 28 Tex. Reg. 9179 (2003) (proposed Oct. 24, 2003).
37. 29 Tex. Reg. 1643 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 114.4 without com-
ment); 28 Tex. Reg. 9176 (2003) (proposed Feb. 20, 2004).
38. See Auto Depot, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1575, 2004 WL 2359727, at *1 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Oct. 11, 2004) (emergency cease and desist order for internet offer of unregistered
notes by unregistered dealers with respect to substandard auto credit without disclosing
federal tax liens, two Texas judgments against the company, risks of the notes, financial
information, and the identity of the principals); In re Nat'l Private Mortgage Serv., Inc.,
1142 [Vol. 58
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involved a challenge to an emergency cease and desist order.39 A consid-
erable portion dealt with sale of oil and gas working interests. 40 Others
involved botched attempts at exemptions from registration,41 non-disclo-
sures of material information, 42 and sales to the public without proper
Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1567, 2004 WL 1869744, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 10, 2004)
(emergency cease and desist order for internet offer of unregistered lending by unregis-
tered dealers of loans for real estate development without disclosing bankruptcy of, and
tax lien against, the principal, financial data; risks of adverse economic conditions; effect of
delays; potential conflict of interests; short operating history; and losses not covered by
insurance); In re Manhattan Gold, Inc., No. ENF-04-CDO-1558, 2004 WL 859153, at *1
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. April 8, 2004) (emergency cease and desist order for sale of unregistered
stock by unregistered dealers on the internet); In re Mid-Continent Oil & Gas, Inc., No.
ENF-04-FIN-1557, 2004 WL 596705, at *1, 3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 15, 2004) (agreed cease
and desist order with two administrative fines of $1,250 for offering oil and gas working
interests in Texas wells to Texans on the internet).
39. See In re Thell G. Prueitt, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1572, 2004 WL 2314506, at *3
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2004) (confirming emergency cease and desist order against
investment contract for ATM machine sold by seminar); see also In re Thell G. Prueitt,
Order No. CDO-1538, 2003 WL 22284602, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2004).
40. See In re Hew-Tex Oil & Gas Corp., Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1571, 2004 WL
2077464, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 8, 2004) (cease and desist order to company selling
unregistered oil and gas working interest in Louisiana well without registering as a dealer
and without disclosing a Pennsylvania cease and desist order); In re Dunwell Corp., Order
No. ENF-04-CDO-1569, 2004 WL 1925428, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 20, 2004) (emer-
gency cease and desist order to company selling oil and gas working interests in Alabama
without disclosing use of funds if insufficient, unlimited liability of working interest, finan-
cial data, prior drilling results, and other offers on different terms, and misleading investors
with claim of no production declines over eight years and describing the risk as "some
risk"); In re Allied Energy Group, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1562, 2004 WL 1217359, at *1-
3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 27, 2004) (agreed cease and desist order and administrative fine of
$8,000 for unregistered oil and gas working interests in Texas without registering as a
dealer and without disclosing a Kentucky cease and desist order); In re First Am. Operat-
ing Co., Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1563, 2004 WL 284158, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 30,
2004) (emergency cease and desist order for unregistered oil and gas working interests in
Texas without registering as a dealer; misrepresentations regarded flow gas from a particu-
lar well, low risk when there was unlimited liability, claim of ninety percent success rate,
and no disclosure of judgments, fines, and lack of good standing as an operator of
corporation).
41. See In re FilmMates Partners, LLC, No. ENF-04-CDO-1556, 2004 WL 506199, at
*1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 5, 2004) (emergency cease and desist order for offer of unregis-
tered units of California limited liability company by unregistered dealers allegedly exempt
for accredited investors, sold by representing minimal risk, registered with SEC, and ex-
empt from TSA, when offering document says high risk and exempt from federal registra-
tion, and urging all investors to represent accredited investor status); In re
KnowledgeBroadcasting.com., LLC, Order No. ENF 04-CDO[FIN-1551, 2004 WL 97526,
at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 9, 2004) (cease and desist order with administrative fine of
$5,000 for selling unregistered preferred units to Texas investors by unregistered dealers
pursuant to a confidential information memorandum).
42. See In re Am. Merchant Consultants, Inc., Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1573, 2004
WL 2314505, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 27, 2004) (emergency cease and desist order for
sale of ATMs with servicing contract without disclosing financials and identities of officers
and directors); In re Kevin D. Sepe, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1570, 2004 WL 2077463, at
*1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 2, 2004) (emergency cease and desist order for sale of unregis-
tered stock in companies without dealer registrations and misrepresenting present and fu-
ture takeover possibilities and omitting bankruptcy filings of principals and financials of
companies); In re John Frederick Williams II, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1568, 2004 WL
1925427, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 20, 2004) (emergency cease and desist order for the
sale of unregistered investment program in heart and body scan imaging center with




The Board also issued a number of no-action letters dealing with issu-
ers. These dealt with plans to privately place notes of a country club to
members, 44 to offer limited partnership interests to fund insurance premi-
ums, 45 to issue certificates of deposit,46 and to buy and sell limited part-
nership interests for firm members. 47
not of record with Secretary of State, bankruptcies, and forgery conviction of principals);In re Glen R. ("Corkey") Campbell, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1566, 2004 WL 1631681, at
*1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 15, 2004) (emergency cease and desist order for sale by newspaper
of investment program to purchase land and resell under lease/purchase or contract-for-deed misrepresenting it as "absolutely safe" and without disclosing the risks of defaults andfinancials of guarantor); In re Ronald Rae Barrick, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1564, 2004WL 1474955, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 17, 2004) (agreed cease and desist order for saleby newspaper of unregistered foreclosure investment program, flipping foreclosures and
splitting the profits, by unregistered dealer without disclosing disbarment, fraud conviction,jail term, and restitution payment of principal); In re BHT Inv. Inc., Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1559, 2004 WL 859154, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. April 13, 2004) (emergency cease
and desist order for sale of unregistered investment opportunities, one to buy late model
cars and sell on e-Bay.com, the other to participate in T-bill lending contracts, by unregis-
tered dealers without disclosing default judgments of principals for investment agreements,
the risks involved, and the company's operating history).
43. See In re Marc Randall Hall, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1565, 2004 WL 1599841, at
*1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 6, 2004) (agreed cease and desist for sale of unregistered builderinvestment program by unregistered dealer using funds to buy land, build homes, and sell
to the public, splitting the profits); In re Cash Link Sys. Inc., Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1563, 2004 WL 1217363, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 27, 2004) (agreed cease and desist
order with administrative fine of $2,000 for sale of unregistered investment contract, anATM machine with service contract, by unregistered dealers); In re Midessa Prop., LP,Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1561, 2004 WL 1017064, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. April 29, 2004)(agreed cease and desist order for sale of unregistered secured first mortgages of Texas
single family homes by unregistered dealers); In re Edward D. Karaback, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1560, 2004 WL 1017063, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. April 27, 2004) (agreed cease anddesist order for sale of unregistered penny stock management program by unregistered
dealers in newspapers).
44. See In re Riverhill Country Club, Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter, 2004 WL2077475, at *1 (July 30, 2004) (granted); In re Dallas Pistol Club, Inc., Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2077472, at *1 (April 26, 2004) (some sales to non-members,
granted).
45. See In re Elite Premium Fin., Ltd., Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter, 2004 WL2077477, at *1 (July 30, 2004) (to the insurance agents selling the insurance structured to
comply with the Texas Insurance Code; granted as heavily regulated by the Department ofInsurance); In re First Portfolio Funding, Ltd., Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter, 2004 WL
2077469, at *1 (Jan. 16, 2004) (same).
46. See In re GMAC Commercial Mortgage Bank, Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter,2004 WL 2077474, at *1 (June 28, 2004) (although Utah industrial loan corporation is not
technically a bank and hence does not fit the exemption from registration for banks (citingTEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5L (Vernon Supp. 2004)); In re State Farm Fin. Servs.,F.S.B., Tex. St. Sec . Bd. No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2077473, at *2-3 (May 5, 2004) (de-
cline to recommend, since sale by third parties does not fit exemption for banks, TEX. REV.CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5L (Vernon Supp. 2004), and since amounts over the federalinsurance of $100,000 do not fit exemption for guaranteed securities, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-5M (Vernon Supp. 2004), and third parties are dealers requiring registration,but will recommend they need not take examination over general securities if sales
limited).
47. See In re Wortham Fin., LP, Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2077471(Mar. 9, 2004) (granted for restructuring of firm to permit small numbers of members to
enter and leave firm, with one entity the buyer and seller of the limited partnership unitsfrom and to the members, provided no more than ten in any twelve months).
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IV. REGISTRATION OF MARKET OPERATORS
One of the underpinnings of state regulation of securities is the re-
quirement to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in
the state and as an investment advisor before rendering investment ad-
vice.48 Registration infractions generally surface when applying or reapp-
lying for registration.
A. DEALERS
The State Securities Board amended its rules for registration of dealers
several times during the Survey period. The Board added a section ex-
empting dealers and their agents from the Board's rules if an exemption
from registration is available or if the antifraud provisions do not apply.
4 9
The Board amended its rule on the application of branch managers; the
Board reduced the examination qualification requirements of branch
managers operating branches limited to activities within the managers'
qualification so as to avoid waiver requests and the subsequent undertak-
ing agreements.50 The Board added several new record keeping require-
ments, focusing on compliance documentation and extending the
retention period to improve the ability of registered dealers to carry out
their supervisory duties and expending the period for the Board to in-
spect registered dealers and coordinate the rules with the federal require-
ments. 51 The Board also amended its fee requirements for dealers52 and
its exemption for third party brokerage arrangements on financial entity
premises, 53 to correspond to recent legislative changes.
The Board pursued numerous enforcement actions against selling
agents and dealers. Selling agent infractions involved selling securities
48. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
49. 29 Tex. Reg. 7966 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 115.1 without com-
ment); 29 Tex. Reg. 1758 (2004) (proposed Feb. 27, 2004).
50. 29 Tex. Reg. 7968 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 115.2 without com-
ment); 29 Tex. Reg. 1759 (2004) (proposed Feb. 27, 2004).
51. 28 Tex. Reg. 9236 (2003) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 115.5 without com-
ment); 28 Tex. Reg. 5949 (2003) (proposed Aug. 1, 2003).
52. 29 Tex. Reg. 1643 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 115.8 without com-
ment); 28 Tex. Reg. 9177 (2003) (proposed Oct. 24, 2003).
53. 29 Tex. Reg. 1645 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 139.20 without com-
ment); 28 Tex. Reg. 9181 (2003) (proposed Oct. 24, 2003).
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while unregistered 54 for another dealer,55 and failing to timely disclose
outside business or other material information. Dealer infractions in-
volved operating branch offices without registration 56 and the failure to
supervise selling agents. 57
The Board also issued a no-action letter dealing a proposal to auction
oil and gas interests over the internet through selling agents. 58
B. INVESTMENT ADVISERS
The Board twice amended its rules for registration of investment advis-
ers. The Board added a section exempting investment advisers from the
Board's rules if an exemption from registration is available or if the an-
tifraud provisions do not apply.5 9 The Board also amended its fee re-
quirements for investment advisers to correspond to recent legislative
54. See In re Rosemary Laughlin, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1574, 2004 WL 2334055, at
*1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 6, 2004) (agreed cease and desist for selling unregistered oil and
gas working interest in Louisiana while unregistered); In re Agent Registration of John
Frank Lopez, Order No. IC04-SUS-13, 2004 WL 1812690, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 30,
2004) (reprimanding and suspending for thirty days for selling unregistered coin-operated,
customer-owned telephone units while unregistered and failing to disclose it on Form U-4);
In re Agent Registration of Gayland Kyle James, Order No. IC04-FIN-08, 2004 WL
1166369, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 13, 2004) (reprimanding and ordering administrative
fine of $1,600 for selling securities while unregistered and not timely filing Form U-4); In re
Agent Registration of Mark Andrew Womack, Order No. IC04-CEN-01, 2004 WL 97542,
at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 14, 2004) (granting application and reprimanding for selling
unregistered investment opportunities while unregistered and failing to determine inves-
tors' suitability, disclose other business on Form U-4, or disclose exorbitant commission);
In re Phil Head, Order No. ENF-04-CDO-1552, 2004 WL 179864, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Jan. 21, 2004) (cease and desist order for offering certificates of deposit by newspapers
without being registered to sell securities or as investment advisers).
55. See In re Agent Registration of Timothy William Harris, Order No. IC04-FIN-04,
2004 WL 474199, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. March 3, 2004) (reprimanding and ordering ad-
ministrative fine of $7,000 for selling unregistered coin-operated, customer-owned tele-
phone units for another dealer and failing to obtain consent of registered dealer or disclose
it on Form U-4); In re Agent Registration of Larry James Kiefer, Order No. IC04-SUS-02,
2004 WL 284157 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 30, 2004) (reprimanding and suspending for thirty
days for selling unregistered interests in viatical settlements for another dealer and failing
to obtain consent of registered dealer or disclose it on Form U-4).
56. See In re Dealer Registration of Pruco Sec., LLC, Order No. IO-4-CAF-12, 2004
WL 1698101, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 13, 2004) (reprimanding and ordering administra-
tive fine of $10,000 for operating office not registered as branch office); In re Dealer Regis-
tration of Woodbury Fin. Servs., Inc., Order No. ID04-FIN-05, 2004 WL 762536, at *1, 3(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. March 25, 2004) (reprimanding and ordering administrative fine of$12,500 for operating numerous offices not registered and using post office boxes as ad-
dresses on Forms U-4).
57. See In re Dealer Registration of Milkie/Ferguson Invs., Inc., Order No. IC04-CAF-
11, 2004 WL 1631679, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 13, 2004) (granting selling agent's appli-
cation while reprimanding and ordering administrative fines of $5,000 from the agent and
$12,000 from the dealer for agent's selling while unregistered and dealer's failures to en-
force supervisory manual, to establish procedures to ensure only registered agents sell, and
to amend Form U-4 within thirty days for changes in employment and office location).
58. See In re Energynet.com, Tex St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 23784, at
*1182 (Nov. 23, 2004) (without registration of the auctioneer; refused since 7 TEX. ADMIN
CODE § 139.12 requires auction by seller or registered dealer and registered agents).
59. 29 Tex. Reg. 1644 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 116.8 without com-
ment); 28 Tex. Reg. 9178 (2003) (proposed Oct. 24, 2003).
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changes and to include a reference to the Board's web site.60
The Board had several enforcement actions against investment advis-
ers. These actions primarily involved rendering service before registra-
tion,61 after registration lapsed and before renewal, or without
registration.62 One action involved an unannounced inspection of an in-
vestment advisor and the discovery of numerous violations along with
refusals to promptly provide documentation and answers, resulting in the
revocation of the investment adviser's registration.
63
The Board also issued a number of no-action letters dealing with in-
vestment advisers. These dealt with plans to provide divorcing couples
with a broad range of advice 64 and to allow subscribers to be instantly
aware when limited partnership's portfolio changes.
65
V. SECURITIES FRAUD
One of the major reasons legislatures passed securities acts was to facil-
itate actions by investors to recover their moneys through a simplified
fraud action that removed the most difficult elements that had to be
proved in a common-law fraud action, namely scienter and privity.
60. 29 Tex. Reg. 1643 (2004) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 115.8 without com-
ment); see 28 Tex. Reg. 9177 (2003) (proposed Oct. 24, 2003).
61. See In re Applications for the Inv. Adviser Registrations of Flyline Mgmt., L.P.,
Order No. IC04-CAF-14, 2004 WL 1812692, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 2, 2004) (granting
application while reprimanding and ordering two administrative fines of $16,000 for ren-
dering services without registration).
62. See In re Applications for Inv. Adviser Registration of Legacy Harbor, Order No.
IC04-CAF-10, 2004 WL 1541320, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 30, 2004) (granting applica-
tion while reprimanding and ordering administrative fine of $18,750 for rendering services
while registration lapsed); In re Application for the Inv. Adviser Representative Registra-
tion of John Kenneth Link, No. IC04-CAF-09, 2004 WL 1541319, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
June 28, 2004) (granting application while reprimanding and ordering administrative fine
of $35,000 and forty-day suspension for rendering services while registration lapsed); In re
Inv. Adviser Registration of Stanley Keith Jones, Order No. IC04-FIN-07, 2004 WL
823721, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. April 7, 2004) (granting application while reprimanding and
ordering administrative fine of $4,000 for rendering services while registration lapsed); In
re TheHedgeFund.com, LLC, Order No. IC04-CDO-06, 2004 WL 762537, at *2 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. March 25, 2004) (cease and desist order with administrative fine of $12,000 for
giving advice without registration).
63. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Veras Inv. Partners, LLC, Order No. IC04-
REV-03, 2004 WL 396815, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 24, 2004) (violations of operating at
a different location, refusal to answer staff questions, failure to disclose other businesses on
Form U-4, failure to immediately provide copies of emails, failure to disclose proper
amount of funds under management and number of limited partnerships for which it is a
general partner on Form ADV, failure to change information on Forms U-4 and ADV
within thirty days, and employing unregistered agent to operate hedge fund).
64. See In re Equitable Divorce Strategies, LLC, Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter,
2003 WL 23784183, at *1 (Nov. 25, 2003) (including tax consequences, real estate obliga-
tions, valuation of retirement plans, as well as investment advice, all without registration as
an investment adviser; refused since likely that for most clients the service will investment
advice).
65. See In re Subscription to Wealth, L.P., Tex. St. Sec. Bd. No-Action Letter, 2004
WL 2077470 (Feb. 27, 2004) (granted for one-hour delayed emails of portfolio changes for
monthly fee as not within definition of investment adviser).
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A. INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THE TEXAS AcTs
The Fifth Circuit considered investor recovery under an "errors and
omissions" insurance policy held by the directors and officers of the is-
suer committing the fraud found liable under the TSA and the TSFA.
The insurance company had forum-shopped by filing a declarative action
in the federal district court based on diversity,66 rather than filing in state
court. The Fifth Circuit is enormously biased in favor of insurance com-
panies.67 The Fifth Circuit refuses to apply Texas's well-settled principles
of insurance law and instead engages in tortured reasoning to arrive at a
predetermined result. 68 The Fifth Circuit's application of the exclusion-
ary clause to a securities fraud lawsuit fits this mold.
In TIG Specialty Insurance Co v. PinkMonkey.com Inc., a state court
had found, among other violations, that a CEO had violated the TSFA by
inducing the investors to purchase the issuer's stock,69 the selling agent
had violated the TSA by aiding the CEO,70 the other directors had vio-
lated the TSA as controlling the issuer, 71 and the issuer had violated the
TSA through its agents. 72 The issuer had purchased an insurance policy
with a securities claims endorsement covering claims for violation of state
securities laws. The policy also had a personal profit exclusion for an
insured who profited from the violation. The insurance company denied
the coverage claims of the perpetrators and filed the declaratory action in
federal court. The district court granted summary judgment for the insur-
ance company; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The exclusion removed cover-
age for the CEO. The investors, by proving the elements for the Texas
Stock Act violation, satisfied the exclusion's two elements, a benefit from
a false representation and no legal entitlement to the benefit. 73 A tor-
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002).
67. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Decisions-A Survey and an Empirical Analysis, 35
TEX. TECH L. REV. 947, 1031-35 (2004).
68. See id. at 1035-36.
[F]ar too many of the Fifth Circuit's conclusions evolved out of thin air. This
was especially true in controversies involving Texas litigants. The court of
appeals either ignored or refused to apply Texas's undisputed principles of
insurance law. Instead the Fifth Circuit created new law and engaged in
strained and convoluted analyses to reach, arguably, predetermined results
.... [Sluch an enterprise does little to garner respect for the court and its
rulings .... [T]he Fifth Circuit's propensity to ignore settled principles of
law conversely cause learned jurists to conclude rightly or wrongly that the
court is biased against insureds.
Id.
69. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 2002).
70. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33F(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (aider
liability).
71. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33F(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (control per-
son liability).
72. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33A (Vernon Supp. 2004) (includes issuer
as seller).
73. The Fifth Circuit previously decided that any infusion of capital into an issuer pro-
vided the benefit to major shareholders of the opportunity to own and participate in a
successful business. See Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 742,
747 (5th Cir. 1999) (school board errors and omission insurance policy for board recom-
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tured interpretation of the language of the exclusion removed coverage
for the selling agent and other directors, defined in the policy as insureds.
Seizing upon a lower court opinion, whose reasoning must be superior to
anything the Fifth Circuit could devise, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
exclusions, such as the one before the court, using "the acts of 'an' or
'any' insured, as opposed to exclusions concerning acts of 'the' insured,
operate to bar coverage for all insureds when one insured commits such
an act."' 74 This conclusion disregards Texas law, which requires interpre-
tations of exclusions as interpreted by the insured if they are reasonable,
even if the insurance company's interpretation is more reasonable. 75
"An" and "any" insured are singular, so limiting the exclusion to only the
acting CEO is reasonable, even if the court believes the plural urged by
the insurance company is better. The issuer was not defined as an in-
sured, so the Fifth Circuit had to engage in one more convoluted analysis.
The limitation clause defined a single "claim" to include all claims arising
from the same wrongful act or continuous acts. So, the claim against the
company based on the CEO's acts was one claim, which was excluded.
Again, this analysis ignores Texas law. Exclusions must be clear and
unambigous.76 Applying a second definition of claim appearing in the
limitation clause to elsewhere in the insurance contract, when one would
have thought that the definition of claim included in the definition section
applied, does not satisfy the Texas standard. 77
One wonders what the issuer paid to obtain this "errors and omissions"
policy. The effect of these Fifth Circuit interpretations of exclusion
clauses in standard securities claims endorsement is to exclude coverage
liability under the TSA and TSFA when the primary perpetrator is in-
cluded in the lawsuit.
B. CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA") 78
provides for the removal to federal court and dismissal of state law secur-
ities class actions involving misrepresentation, omission, or deception
with respect to the purchase of the securities of public companies.
mendation to invest in board member's company). The ability to rescind under the Texas
Stock Fraud Act, satisfied the absence of legal entitlement. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01(b) (Vernon 2002) (actual damages); Scott v. Sebree, 968 S.W.2d 364, 368-69
(Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied) ("actual damages" in Texas Stock Fraud Act means
damages for fraud at common law, which included rescission in lieu of monetary dam-
ages). These arguments would also apply to the Texas Securities Act. See TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33D (Vernon Supp. 2004) (rescission remedy).
74. See Coregis Ins. Co. v. Lyford, 21 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (profes-
sional liability insurance policy for law firm).
75. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hudson Energy Co., Inc., 811 S.W.2d
552, 555 (Tex. 1991); TIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. PinkMonkey.com Inc., 375 F.3d 365, 373-74
(5th Cir. 2004) (dissent).
76. See Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d at 555.
77. See PinkMonkey.com Inc., 375 F.3d at 376-77 (Pickering, J., dissenting).




SLUSA does not prevent the shareholders from suing individually under
state law. In Blaz v. Belfer,79 the Fifth Circuit confronted an attempt to
circumvent SLUSA. The investors' lawyer brought a class action under
the TSFA against Enron Corporation, cleverly defining the class period
as ending shortly before the passage of SLUSA and three years and one
day before the alleged discovery of the fraud. With this definition, the
investors could not bring a federal action because the then applicable
three-year limitations period had passed. 80 The investors could bring the
Texas class action under its longer limitations period, 81 provided SLUSA
did not apply to conduct before its passage. The issuer removed the state
action to federal court under SLUSA and the district court dismissed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed and determined that the application of SLUSA
to this state class action did not have an impermissible retroactive effect.
Under the Supreme Court's standards, retroactive legislation is permitted
if it does not impair a party's rights when he acted, increase a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties for transactions already
completed. 82 Procedural rules fit this permission; class actions are proce-
dural under Texas law. 83
C. ARBITRATION UNDER THE TEXAS AcTs
Securities fraud is also a method for investors to reach their own bro-
kers; however, these actions are usually subject to arbitration as provided
in their broker contracts. Since securities transactions are "transactions
involving commerce," the Federal Arbitration Act, rather than the Texas
Arbitration Act, applies.8 4 Since 1989, the Supreme Court has permitted
arbitration of securities fraud actions under the federal act.8 5 There were
several arbitrations against brokers conducted by the NASD involving
the TSA. Arbiters seldom explain their decisions as appellate courts do
and need not follow the rules of law.8 6 Yet, some trends are
ascertainable.
79. 368 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2004).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2002) (one year from discovery, but no more than three).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (2003) has since
changed this to a five-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2002) (two years
from discovery, but no more than five).
81. The applicable statute of limitations for the Texas Stock Fraud Act is the residual
four-year limitations period. See Pooley v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied); Sullivan v. Hoover, 782 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1989, no writ); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (1997).
82. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
83. See S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437 (Tex. 2000).
84. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2002); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp.
2004). See, e.g., In re Mony Sec. Corp., 83 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2002, no pet.).
85. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 453 (1989)(under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
238 (1987) (under the Exchange Act of 1934).
86. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1952) (holding that arbiters are not




Arbitrations almost invariably deal with investments that declined in
value-typically more than $500,000. One broker complained against an
investor for a debit balance in a margin account.87 Investor complaints
involved unsuitability,88 wrongful recommendations, 89 recommendations
87. For investor recovery, see U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc. v. Woodward, No. 02-
03779, 2004 WL 101801 (Jan. 6, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($279,172 claim for debit amount
resulting from refusal to cover margin call, countered with $500,000 for unsuitability under
TSA and DTPA; settled with $50,000 for investor and $5,000 for attorney's fees).
88. For claimant recoveries, see Rogers v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
No. 03-06582, 2004 WL 2093152 (Sept. 10, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($500,000 claims for rec-
ommendations for mutual funds that did not meet broker's guidelines for people of inves-
tor's age and situation under DTPA; awarded $72,507 with $5,000 punitive damages,
$28,717 attorney's fees, $4,000 costs, $3,835 expert fees, and $1,000 discovery sanctions);
Pearlman v. Brookstreet Sec. Corp., No. 02-06622, 2004 WL 1837710 (July 27, 2004)
(N.A.S.D. arb.) ($469,756 claim for option trades in technology stocks and margin trading
in retirement account under the TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; awarded $358,400 with $100,000
attorney's fees and $35,000 costs); Hanson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No. 02-
03174, 2003 WL 22951953 (Nov. 30, 2003) ($600,000 claim for selling high risk mutual funds
for conservative investment objective under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; awarded $86,500 with
$33,974 attorney's fees and $10,000 witness fees); see also Cabanas v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., No. 02-05156, 2004 WL 2293463 (Sept. 30, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($500,000 claim
for unsuitable recommendations under TSA and DTPA; dismissed and expunged by settle-
ment (amount unspecified)); George v. Sands Bros. & Co., No. 02-03737, 2004 WL 307215
(Feb. 2, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($167,000 claims for safe representation while placing in
unsuitable high risk technology stocks under TSA and DTPA; awarded $67,906 plus $1,250
attorney's fees).
For respondent dismissals, see Stovall v. Edward D. Jones & Co., No. 03-08482, 2004 WL
2029432 (Aug. 26, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($800,000 claim for wholly unsuitable stocks, high
risk technology stocks, for trust fund under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA); Broussard v. Ci-
tigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 03-01801, 2004 WL 1047872 (April 30, 2004) (N.A.S.D.
arb.) ($200,000 claim for recommendations to purchase stocks for disabled investor lacking
experience under TSA and TSFA); Bulko v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., No. 02-10715, 2004
WL 726166 (Mar. 15, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($18,000,000 claim for margin and unsuitable
recommendations for a retiree recovering from brain surgery under TSA, TSFA, and
DPTA); William Tiffany v. Wachovia Sec. Fin. Network, No. 02-04059, 2004 WL 726148
(Mar. 7, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($350,000 claim for unsuitable investments in high tech
stocks under TSA and TSFA); Briggs v. All-Tech Inv. Group, Inc., No. 99-02567, 2004 WL
583887 (Mar. 9, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($100,000 claim for unsuitable accumulation of sig-
nificant positions in stocks under TSA); Tiffany v. Wachovia Sec. Fin. Network, No. 02-
039239, 2004 WL 527034 (Mar. 2, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($250,000 claim for unsuitable
investments in high tech stocks under TSA and TSFA); Tiffany v. Wachovia Sec. Fin. Net-
work, No. 02-03425, 2004 WL 433803 (Feb. 11, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($1,000,000 claim for
unsuitable investments in high tech stocks under TSA and TSFA).
89. For claimant recoveries, see Messina v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., No. 02-01201, 2004 WL 2191739 (Sept. 15, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($531,855 claim for
wrongful recommendations under TSA and DTPA; dismissed and expunged by settlement
(amount unspecified)); Guidry v. Stephens, Inc., No. 01-05050, 2004 WL 1977486 (Aug. 19,
2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($1,000,000 claim for wrongfully recommending unspecified technol-
ogy stocks on margin under TSA and DTPA; dismissed and expunged by settlement
(amount unspecified)).
For respondent dismissals, see Bodle v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No.
02-03977, 2004 WL 2029440 (Aug. 24, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($500,000 claim for wrongful
recommendation in volatile securities under the DTPA); Vanderham v. Brookstreet Sec.
Corp., No. 03-01901, 2004 WL 1908063 (Aug. 5, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($750,000 claim for
recommending investment in fund writing puts and calls under the TSA and TSFA); Black
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 03-01111, 2004 WL 1673717 (July 1, 2004) (N.A.S.D.
arb.) (unspecified claim for recommendations in risky, volatile, undercapitalized, illiquid,
and high-risk securities under TSA, DTPA, and TSFA); Small v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 03-00190, 2004 WL 785042 (Mar. 24, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.)
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tainted by analysts' conflicts of interest, 90 unauthorized trades, 91 misman-
agement of investments, 92 providing improper employee benefit informa-
tion,9 3 lack of broker supervision,94 execution errors, 95 and aiding and
($2,021,628 claim for recommendations and subsequent decline in named stocks under
TSA, TSFA, and DPTA); Smith v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., No. 02-07690, 2004 WL
583883 (Mar. 5, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($1,000,000 claim for aggressive investment strategy
in initial public offerings and using margin debt under TSA and DPTA).
90. For respondent dismissals, see Gilmore v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., No. 03-01610, 2004 WL 1804100 (July 17, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($1,291,557 claim for
tainted stock recommendation under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA); Montgomery v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 03-04002, 2004 WL 1397579 (June 7, 2004)(N.A.S.D. arb.) ($356,187 claim for tainted stock recommendations under TSA, TSFA, and
DTPA); Johnson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 02-07632, 2004 WL
1397535 (June 3, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($433,990 claim for tainted recommendations under
TSA, TSFA, and DTPA); Stirm v. Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 02-
07686, 2004 WL 835776 (April 2, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($120,938 claim for tainted recom-
mendations under TSA and TSFA).
The taint stems from the conflict of interest of full-service brokerage houses, whose re-
search analysts compensation, designed to attract underwriting clients, favored coverage
and buy recommendations for underwriting clients and potential underwriting clients. See
George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 57 SMU L. REV. 1207, 1228 (2004) (substantial
recoveries for the offense by the Texas State Securities Board).
91. For claimant recoveries, see Tipton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., No. 03-05587, 2004
WL 2093116 (Sept. 7, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($75,000 claim for unauthorized sale of stock
and purchase of municipal bonds under DTPA; awarded $92,388 with $29,740 attorney's
fees and $2,500 expert witness fees); Harris v. Josephthal & Co., No. 01-07090, 2004 WL
1146454 (May 7, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($606, 349 claim for unauthorized trading and trans-
fer of funds to third parties by investor's son under the TSA; awarded with $86,162 in
attorney's fees).
92. For respondent dismissals, see Foster v. Bank One Sec. Corp., No. 03-03796, 2004
WL 1445933 (June 16, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($95,000 claim for mishandling of account,
including high risk investments and use of margin under TSA and DTPA).
93. For claimant recoveries, see Lopez v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
No. 02-04422, 2004 WL 306981 (Feb. 5, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($3,000,000 claims for advis-
ing exercise of employee stock options and placement of resulting securities in margin
account to pay exercise costs and tax under DTPA; awarded $5,391,000 less $21,507
counterclaim).
For respondent dismissals, see Knotts v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No.
02-02697, 2004 WL 1397573 (June 7, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($83,880 claim for advising
moneys from employer plan could not be rolled over into a brokerage account resulting in
tax under DTPA).
94. For claimant recoveries, see Doherty v. Gruntal & Co., No. 00-03697, 2004 WL
1673573 (July 7, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($5,000,000 claim for failure to supervise broker
with discretion under DTPA; awarded $270,300 with $100,000 attorney's fees).
95. For claimant recoveries, see Anton v. Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc., No. 02-01659, 2003
WL 22999404 (Dec. 5, 2003) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($1,000,000 claim for improper execution of
trading naked put options and unauthorized trades under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA;
awarded $220,829); Deprato v. Prudential Equity Group, Inc., No. 02-06293, 2003 WL
23104635 (Dec. 4, 2003) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($150,000 claim for recommending annuities with
a guaranteed retirement income benefit and subsequent purchase of annuities without this
feature, but a stepped-up death benefit when investor had no heirs under the TSA, TSFA,
and DTPA; awarded rescission for $345,000, $95,320 attorney's fees, and $9,340 witness
fees).
For respondent dismissals, see Bondy v. Sanders Morris Harris, Inc., No. 02-02245, 2004
WL 383604 (Feb. 16, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($500,000 claim for order execution of unspeci-
fied securities under DTPA); Eastwood v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., No. 02-01639, 2004
WL 307218 (Feb. 4, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($1,357,688 claim for order execution of unspeci-
fied securities under TSA); S&R P'ship v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 02-07189, 2003 WL
23104663 (Dec. 17, 2003) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($19,590 claim for not completing purchase of
stock later subject to tender offer due to lack of documentation under the TSA).
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abetting violations.96 Other reported actions did not specify the
offense. 97
D. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
As a result, Texas courts interpreting the TSA frequently look to the fed-
eral decisions. During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit decided four
cases concerning securities fraud, most under Rule 10b-5. 98 A private
securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5 has five elements in connection
96. For claimant recoveries, see Engelbrecht v. M.G. Sec. Group, Inc., No. 03-03668,
2004 WL 1672206 (July 12, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($28,550 claim for specific stock transac-
tion under TSFA; awarded $32,852 with $18,000 attorney's fees).
For respondent dismissals, see Trefny v. Bear Stearns Sec. Corp., No. 00-01353, 2004 WL
433973 (Feb. 20, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($9,858,422 claim for assisting president of introduc-
ing broker to make withdrawals from customer accounts through false statements and
lending to in excess of margin requirements for purchase of worthless bonds placed in
customer accounts under TSA, TSFA, and DPTA).
97. For claimant recoveries, see Mitchell v. Baird Mgmt. Corp., No. 03-05374, 2004 WL
2191795 (Sept. 14, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($400,000 claim for concentrations in high risk,
speculative technology funds under DTPA; awarded $300,000 with $50,000 attorney's fees
and $15,000 costs); Kaufman v. Stephens, Inc., No. 03-04999, 2004 WL 1445940 (June 8,
2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($500,000 claim under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; dismissed and ex-
punged by settlement (amount unspecified)); Miller v. Scott D. Ricketts Fin. Marketplace
Group, LLC, No. 02-06986, 2004 WL 433769 (Feb. 6, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($275,000 claim
for converting diversified portfolio to risky and volatile stocks and options under DTPA;
awarded $213,500 with $25,000 attorney's fees and $1,700 costs); see also Al-Adli v. Ci-
tigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 02-04043, 2004 WL 1496617 (June 1, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.)
($187,000 claims for unspecified stock under TSFA; denied by settlement (amount
unspecified)).
For respondent dismissals, see Thompson v. Main Street Mgmt. Co., No. 03-04304, 2004
WL 2240052 (Sept. 23, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($160,000 claim for purchase of unspecified
mutual funds under the TSA, TSFA, and DTPA); Tanus v. United Am. Int'l, Inc., No. 00-
01821, 2004 WL 1977524 (Aug. 23, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($600,000 claim for purchase of
volatile stock under DTPA; dismissed); Andretti v. Main Street Mgmt. Co., No. 03-02887,
2004 WL 1949309 (Aug. 20, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($500,000 claim for purchase of various
mutual funds under DTPA); K-Mo Props., Ltd. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 03-
02526, 2004 WL 1908053 (Aug. 7, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($521,266 claim for investments in
science and technology funds under DTPA); Koach v. Wachovia Sec. LLC, No. 03-05589,
2004 WL 1774979 (July 21, 2004) (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($2,095,529 claim for purchase of unspec-
ified stock and options under the TSA, TSFA, and DTPA); Betts v. Morgan Stanley DW,
Inc., No. 02-06549, 2004 WL 1397574 (N.A.S.D. arb.) ($700,000 claim for investments in
common stock and mutual funds under DTPA; dismissed); Freeman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 03-00585, 2004 WL 345705 (Feb. 10, 2004) (N.A.S.D.
arb.) ($500,000 claim for unspecified stocks held in the account under TSA and TSFA);
Allyn v. RLS & Assoc., No. 02-03901, 2003 WL 23104664 (Dec. 17, 2003) (N.A.S.D. arb.)
($1,937,367 claim for transactions in technology stock and options with margin under
TSFA and DTPA).
98. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit considered a criminal case involving an aider of a Ponzi
investment scheme. See United States v. Dale, 374 F.3d 321, 324, 326 (5th Cir. 2004). The
aider allowed the perpetrator to transfer the victims' moneys through his company's bank
accounts for a fee. The aider challenged his conviction claiming he lacked knowledge of
the fraudulent nature of his co-defendant's activities and simply followed orders. But the
aider had used the money that appeared in his company's accounts to purchase substantial
personal luxuries, prepared investor marketing letters for the perpetrator containing lies
about his company, and attended sales pitches made to the investors without correcting the
lies told by the perpetrator. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
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with a sale or purchase of securities: "(1) a misstatement or an omission
(2) of material fact, (3) made with scienter (4) on which plaintiff relied
(5) that proximately caused plaintiff's injury." 99
With respect to materiality, in Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc.,1°° the
Fifth Circuit dealt with an omission from a registration statement for an
initial public offering. 10 1 The omitted facts dealt regarded a sharp rise
and fall in natural gas prices over four months, three months before the
offering. The prospectus spoke of a substantial increase in gas prices over
the last two years preceding the offer. The investors alleged that al-
though these statements were true, they were nevertheless misleading
due to the omission of the price drop and that the SEC regulations re-
quired inclusion of the omitted facts as a trend.102 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint.' 0 3 An omission is not material unless there is "a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available."'01 4 The total mix includes cau-
tionary statements contained in the prospectus 10 5 and publicly available
information. 10 6 The suspect prospectus contained cautionary statements
concerning the volatility of natural gas prices. The national newspapers
quote natural gas prices daily. Therefore, the omissions were not mate-
rial. With respect to the trend requirement, the standard is one of negli-
gence with respect to the predictive value of the reported results.10 7 The
investors had three documents indicative of the issuer's knowledge of the
trend. The subsequent year's quarterly report to the SEC indicated no
meaningful decline in revenues. The press release issued two months af-
ter the offering described delays in the business, but also suggested they
arose from the change from shallow drilling to deeper drilling. Caution-
99. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 406-07 (5th Cir. 2001).
100. 379 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2004).
101. The action for a misstatement in a registration statement is a simplified fraud ac-
tion. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2002) (lacking the scienter and reliance elements, and providing
a defense of lack of knowledge). The materiality requirement, however, is the same as
under Rule 10b-5. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 873-74 (5th Cir. 2003);
Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., 186 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 1999).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2002) ("In case any part of the registration statement ...
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading .... ); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2004) (requiring disclosure
of any known trends that impact net sales or revenue or income from continuing
operations).
103. Actions under the Securities Act only require notice pleading, and not the detailed
pleading mandated by FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for fraud. See In re Nations Mart Corp., Sec.
Litigation, 130 F.3d 309, 315-16 (8th Cir. 1997) (as proof of fraud or mistake not a prereq-
uisite to liability under the Securities Act of 1933, § 11; 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2002)).
104. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232-33 (1988) (citing Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)) (proxy)).
105. See Klein v. Gen. Nutrition Co., 186 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999); Olkey v. Hype-
rion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1996).
106. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1199 (2d
Cir. 1993).
107. See Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2002).
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ary language in the draft prospectus did not indicate knowledge of a
trend. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
10 8
With respect to scienter, in Southland Securities Corp. v. Inspire Insur-
ance Solutions Inc., the Fifth Circuit rejected the group pleading doctrine
for a class action under Rule 10b-5. 10 9 The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") requires investors in class actions for
misleading statements and omissions to specify in their pleading each
statement made by the defendant alleged to be misleading, the reasons
why it is misleading, and the facts giving a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind.1 10 The federal rules for
securities fraud additionally require the identity of the speaker, and the
location and time where the statement occurred. 1 ' The group pleading
doctrine allows investors to rely on a presumption that statements in pro-
spectuses, registration statements, annual reports, and press releases are
the collective work of the individuals involved in the everyday business of
the issuer, the directors and executive officers. The Fifth Circuit had
never adopted the group pleading doctrine.1 1 2 The trial court dismissed
the action for failure to state a claim because the group pleading doctrine
used by the investors did not satisfy the PSLRA. The Fifth Circuit con-
firmed that the group pleading doctrine violates the PSLRA's scienter
requirement as providing no strong inference concerning a particular of-
ficer's state of mind. Consequently, most of the investors' alleged mis-
statements failed the pleading requirements due to the group pleading
doctrine, failure to explain the inaccuracies, failure to provide when and
where, consisting of non-actionable puffery,11 3 or consisting of analysts'
forecasts without an allegation of entanglement by the issuer.11 4 The in-
vestors also had other problems with the strong inference of scienter, pro-
viding only substantial insider sales during the year. The Fifth Circuit
only accepts this evidence as a strong inference if the trades are made in
"suspicious amounts or at suspicious times."1 1 5 The participation of only
some of the executive officers in the issuer's secondary offering lacked
allegations that such sales were unusual. Other sales during times of no
price volatility were not suspicious. Only sales near the all-time high
108. Kapps, 379 F.3d 221. Kapps arose in Louisiana, but reflects the Fifth Circuit's
thoughts on materiality.
109. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004); see also Dunn v. Borta, 369 F.3d 421, 434 (4th
Cir. 2004) (not reaching the issue); Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563,
569 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 40 (1st Cir. 2002)
(same).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2002); Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 U.S. Stat. 737, 758-62
(1996).
111. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
112. The doctrine comes from the Ninth and Second Circuits. See Wool v. Tandem
Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987); Lucy v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d
Cir. 1986).
113. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 869 (5th Cir. 2003); Raab v. Gen.
Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993).
114. See In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2002); Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
115. See Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 435 (5th Cir. 2002).
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made the month before the press release containing the negative truthful
information appeared suspicious. Consequently, the only actionable mis-
representation concerned the CEO's speaking to securities analysts, tout-
ing a contract and predicting future earnings therefrom without using
cautionary language. The misrepresentation was coupled with the infer-
ence of scienter from his sales the following month followed by a press
release revising the prediction downward due to lower expectations from
the contract. 116 As to the issuer, the court will impute to the issuer mis-
statements and omissions made by a director or an executive officer with
the requisite scienter, but not collectively, with one making the misstate-
ment and another knowing its falsity. Consequently, the CEO's misrep-
resentation with the scienter from the sales also provides an actionable
misrepresentation against the issuer. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. 117
With respect to reliance, in Greenberg v. Crossroads Systems, Inc.,118
the Fifth Circuit opined on the application of the fraud-on-the-market
theory to a Rule lOb-5 class action concerning a precipitous drop in an
issuer's stock price before and after a press release containing much nega-
tive information. The trial court granted summary judgment to the issuer
finding the price decline after the "truthful" announcement as statistically
insignificant. In 1988, the Supreme Court eased the reliance requirement
for class actions under Rule 10b-5 actions due to the unduly burdensome
proof showing every class member's individual reliance by allowing,
under the fraud-on-the-market theory, a rebuttable presumption of reli-
ance if the investors show that the issuer made material misrepresenta-
tions, the issuer's shares were traded in an efficient market, and the
investors traded shares between the time of the misrepresentations and
the time of truthful disclosure. 119 Rebuttal information included situa-
tions such as market makers' knowledge of the matter, information
leaked from issuer sources, or any unrelated investor concerns, that sev-
ered the link between the alleged misrepresentation or omission and the
price received or paid by the investor. In 2001, the Fifth Circuit ruled
that the investors must also show that the complained of misrepresenta-
tion or omission actually affected the price, such as manifesting an in-
crease in price following release of false positive information or decrease
in price following revelation of true negative information. 120 For this test,
the trial court used a two-day window following the release of informa-
tion, unchallenged by the investors. The trial court found statistical insig-
nificance because the price drop during the six-month class period was so
116. The PSLRA has a safe-harbor rule for predictive statements accompanied by cau-
tionary language. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(i)(1), 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (2002).
117. Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004).
118. 364 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2004).
119. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247-49 n.27 (1988).
120. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 414-15 (5th Cir. 2001) (case where
price went in opposite direction, down over five months on false positive information and
up over several months on true negative information).
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much greater than the drops in the two-day periods.121 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the test is the percentage of the drop following the release
of the truthful information, not its comparison with some other percent-
ages. Consequently, the sixty-three percent drop was statistically signifi-
cant. This price drop, however, is not enough to trigger the presumption.
The investors must also show that an earlier false, non-confirmatory
statement also actually affected the price. The market has already di-
gested information from confirmatory statements and therefore, they do
not cause a change in stock price. Only three statements concerning the
interoperability of the issuer's products and four earnings statements met
this requirement. The investors could not show that the price drop came
from the interoperability included within the truthful statement rather
than the other negative matters contained within the truthful statement.
But the Fifth Circuit accepted the earnings statements as satisfying the
requirement. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. 122
With respect to damages, in SEC v. United Energy Partners, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit dealt with a fraud action brought by the SEC under Rule
10b-5 involving a disgorgement order. In a private placement of working
interests in oil wells, the officers of a company raised double the amount
of money needed for the wells, using one-half for the company's opera-
tions, contrary to statements in the private placement memoranda to
spend all the funds on drilling. The trial court ordered the officers to
disgorge $7.5 million, awarded pre-judgment interest of $2 million, and
imposed civil penalties of $110,000 each. The officers wanted to offset
the disgorgement by legitimate business expenses of the company be-
cause they did not have sufficient funds to disgorge. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, claiming that the overwhelming weight of authority lay against
the offset, citing only two district court cases to one permitting the
offset. 123
121. Such drops could be signs that insiders privy to the truth are bailing out or that
bear-raiders are selling convinced of the falsehood of the issuer's statements.
122. Greenberg, 364 F.3d 670-71.
123. SEC v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 88 Fed. Appx. 744 (5th Cir. 2004). See SEC
v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1998); SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp.,
917 F. Supp. 1080, 1086-87 (D.N.J. 1996) (overwhelming weight), affd, 124 F.3d 449 (3d
Cir. 1997); SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214-15 (E.D. Mich. 1991);
SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); SEC v. World Gambling Corp.,
555 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1112 (1984). Contra SEC v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95(W.D.N.Y. 1990). Other district courts agree with the Fifth Circuit.
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